I. INTRODUCTION On October 29, 1984, a new era began in the relationship between law and cable television. On that day the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the "Cable Act") was signed into law. ' The Cable Act is the first comprehensive federal cable legislation. Prior to its passage, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") regulated cable pursuant to its "ancillary" power over broadcasting 2 through the Communications Act of 1934,3 which was enacted long before the technology of cable was invented,4 and hardly drafted with cable in mind.
Regulatory problems were created by the fact that different levels of government were involved in the regulation of cable. Not only did the FCC have an interest in protecting broadcast television,5 state and local governments had an interest in overseeing the cable operator's use of public streets and rights-ofway. "A city needs control over the number of times its citizens must bear the inconvenience of having its streets dug up and the best times for it to occur. Thus, government and cable operators (Supp. III 1985) ). Since the legislative history and many courts use the numbering of sections from the original law as passed, this Article will also use that numbering in the text. Footnotes will provide both section numbers where appropriate.
2 See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) . But see Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S, 691 (1984) (upholding FCC regulation whose purpose was to ensure that" 'the benefits of cable communications become a reality on a nationwide basis.''' [d. at 708, quoting Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation-CATV, Report and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 855, para. 33 at 865 (1975) ).
3 47 U.S.C. § § 151-610 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) . 4 In 1948, one of the earliest, if not the first, cable television systems wa,s constructed in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, by an appliance store owner who built it to create demand for television sets at his store. S. WEINSTEIN, GETTING THE PICTURE (1986) .
5 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 303. The FCC has stated that cable uses "broadcast signals as the backbone of the service they provide." CATV, First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, para. 46 at 222 (1969).
1 defined the scope of regulatory power at all levels of government. The local franchising process was termed "the primary means of cable television regulation,"13 subject now to explicit statutory limitation.
As with any major new law, litigation has begun to determine the scope and meaning of the statute. This Article will explore the first judicial attempts to interpret the Cable Act. A common thread running through these varied cases, if any, is the courts' apparent lack of appreciation of the Act's complexity. Many, though not all, decisions appear to misread congressional language and misinterpret congressional intent. Future litigation will inevitably explore these issues more fully and perhaps with a fuller understanding of the regulatory framework Congress attempted to create.
The first part of this Article will discuss issues common to all sections of the Cable Act: the purposes of the Act, retroactivity and grandfathering, and the constitutionality of cable regulation. 14 The second part will discuss judicial interpretation of specific sections of the Act: rate regulation, modification, tenants' access to cable television and cable piracy.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CABLE ACT

A. Purposes of the Cable Act
In interpreting any federal statute, it is critical to determine the intent of Congress in enacting the legislation. "If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect."15 Even if Congress did not expressly address a particular "precise" issue before a court, questions of the coverage of a statute may still be resolved by an evaluation of "the policy concerns that motivated the enactment."16 . When Congress enacted the Cable Act, it attempted to explicitly enumerate the "policy concerns" behind the statute. Ironically, the concerns were so numerous and so complex that N.M. 345, 707 P.2d 1155 (1985) (state regulation of data transmission services offered by a cable operator are not preempted).
13 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19. [Vol. 6: 1 the statement of congressional intent has frequently confused the courts, rather than elucidated them. The first section of the Cable Act,17 details six purposes for the legislation:
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications; (2) establish franchise procedures and standards which encourage the growth· and development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests of the local community; (3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local authority with respect to the regulation of cable systems; (4) assure that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public; (5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which protects cable operators against unfair denials of renewal where the operator's past performance and proposal for future performance meet the standards established by this subchapter; and (6) promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems. 18
This list reflects the intricate compromise hammered out by Congress. 19 The purposes of the Cable Act are many, and occasionally border on being contradictory, because Congress was attempting to balance conflicting interests of the regulators (the franchising authorities), the regulated (the cable companies), and the public. 20 Nonetheless, several early interpretations of congressional purpose have missed the full scope of interests that Congress was trying to accommodate. The clearest misstatement was made by the FCC in its primary Rule Making on the Cable ACt. 21 After stating that "in 17 The major sections of the Cable Act that are not in Title Six involve pole attachments, sec. 4 (amending Title Two); unauthorized reception of satellite programming, sec. 5 (Title Seven); the Telecommunications Policy Study Commission, sec. 8 (Title Seven).
18 Cable Act § 601, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. III 1985) . 19 In the words of the lead sponsor of the Cable Act in the House of Representatives: "This legislation has not been put together hastily; it is a carefully crafted set of compromises that has emerged from over 3 years of hearings, discussions, and negotiations by members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and representatives of the cities, the cable industry, and many others." 130 CONGo REC. HIO,435 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth). 20 See 130 CONGo REC. S14.283 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater) (The Cable Act is "proconsumer, procity, and procable."). 21 See Implementation, supra note 10.
adopting appropriate regulatory standards we must keep in mind the underlying purposes of the Cable Act,"22 the FCC described, with selective quotations, the goals of the Cable Act as stated in the Act itself:
Foremost among these [purposes] is the intent of the statute to establish "standards which encourage the growth and development of cable systems ... assure that cable communications provide ... the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public" and "promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems. "23
This condensation of congressional purpose supports the FCC's view that the primary intent of Congress was to "significantly deregulate the provision of cable service."24 A deleted phrase of the statutory purpose, however, expresses congressional support for franchise standards and procedures "which assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests of the local community .'~25 The complete statutory language indicates that Congress was as concerned with guaranteeing the continuation of necessary regulatory oversight of cable systems, as it was with removing unnecessary regulation. The court that reviewed the FCC's rulemaking recognized that Congress was attempting to strike a balance between these interests. "In establishing regulatory guidelines, Congress was concerned both with relieving the cable industry from unnecessary, burdensome regulation and with ensuring that cable systems remain responsive to the needs of the public."26 Several courts have been as myopic as the FCC, however, in describing congressional intent. For instance, one narrow question was whether the automatic five percent annual rate increase, available to cable operators whose rates were regulated,27 could be taken twice within a few months if the months were in different calendar years. One court relied on "Congress' unmistakable intent to limit governmental rate regulation in favor of marketplace competi- ) . In fact, the court appeared to chide the FCC for its one-sided interpretation. While reversing an FCC decision limiting the "tiers" of programming subject to rate regulation, the court stated that, "the Commission invokes what it perceives to be the general deregulatory focus of the Act." Id. slip op. at 33.
[Vol. 6: 1 tion."28 This statement of purpose was irrelevant to the issue before the court, since the problem before the court covered rates which Congress had determined could be regulated. Moreover, Congress did indeed believe that, in localities where true competition exists, rate regulation was unnecessary.29 Congress also stated that such regulation was still needed, and thus would be permitted wherever cable systems were not subject to effective competition. 30 This court did not address this countervailing interest.
In Tribune-United Cable of Montgomery County v. Montgomery County,31 the Fourth Circuit considered whether a franchising authority had the power to penalize a cable operator for violations of a franchise provision after the operator had sought to obtain modification of that provision. 32 The court gave a subtle reemphasis of Congressional intent:
The purposes and thrust of the Act, however, evince a congressional desire that franchise agreements be applied and modified so as to obtain a realistic and flexible regulatory framework recognizing the needs of both local governments and cable operators, but primarily concerned with providing viable cable systems responsive to the needs and interests of the local communities they serve. 33
The Fourth Circuit omitted from its description of intent, the statutory language expressing the congressional desire that franchising procedures "assure" the responsiveness of cable systems to the needs and interests of their communities. 34 By overlooking the word "assure," the court appeared to devalue the role Congress intended for local regulatory control. 35 34 Cable Act § 601(2), 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (Supp. III 1985) . 35 The legislative history stresses congressional "reliance on the local franchising process as the primary means of cable television regulation, while defining and limiting the authority that a franchising authority may exercise through the franchise process." HOUSE REPORT, supm note 8, at 19; see Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enter., 633 F. Supp. 1315 , 1318 (D. Del. 1986 ) (describing one of the purposes of the Cable Act as making "the local franchising process the primary means of cable television regulation ").
erroneously implied a congressional determination that an economically "viable" system will be "responsive" to the community. 36 The court in Housatonic Cable Vision Co. v. Department of Public Utility Control,37 produced a more sophisticated arid more accurate analysis of congressional intent. That court concluded that Congress obviously had not intended to preempt all local regulation,38 but instead had chosen, "to create a finely-tuned system coordinating federal, state, and local authority and also to preserve those provisions of existing franchises that were not inconsistent with the Cable Act."39 . Therefore, the question on any given issue of cable regulation remains as to what level of government Congress granted authority. The court in Housatonic Cable Vision held that a local regulation would be struck down if it would "frustrate the effectiveness of the Cable Act,"40 but will be .valid if it is "not expressly prohibited and can coexist with the Cable ACt."41 Congress established a presumption that most regulatory power would reside at the 10callevel,42 but intended that the courts should decide to what extent local power had been limited. In City of New York v. FCC,43 the court erroneously stated that Congress intended to "balance" the regulatory jurisdiction of local authorities with that of the FCC: "The Cable Act sought to balance two conflicting goals: 'preserv[ing] the critical role of municipal governments in the franchise process, , . . . while affirming the FCC's 'exclusive jurisdiction over cable service, and overall facilities which relate to such service .... ' "44 There are two errors in this analysis. First, unlike the description of the "critical role" of local governments, the statement in the House Report discussing the FCC's role does not come from the congressional statement of 36 Where to strike this balance will not always be obvious. A careful reading of the purposes should inform courts that Congress did not intend for there to be simple answers. The Cable Act is "a carefully crafted set of compromises,"5o balancing competing and conflicting interests. The difficult task assigned to the judiciary is to ensure the maintenance of that precarious balance sought by Congress, i.e., to " 
B. Retroactivity and Grandfathering
Cable television has been subject to local governmental regulation since its inception, more than three decades before the Cable Act. 52 While the Act explicitly governs franchises awarded or renewed after the Act's effective date,53 a different analysis is needed to determine the validity of laws, regulations, and franchise agreements that predate the Act. There are two related issues: 1) whether the provisions of the Act are to apply retroactively; and 2) whether prior regulatory obligation is continued in effect by the Act's "grandfather" provisions.
In [Vol. 6: 1 gests that Congress intended to only govern arrangements that followed that date. If Congress had wished to alter rights or obligations arising prior to the passage of the Act, the relevant governing provisions would have been made effective immediately. The court's finding that the Cable Act is not to be applied retroactively is consistent with both the Act itself and prior court rulings on retroactivity.60 The court, however, in its analysis, seems to confuse retroactivity with grandfathering. The fundamental distinction between the two concepts is that a statute with retroactive effect changes rights and liabilities that have accrued prior to its enactment,61 while grandfathering continues the force of a law or franchise subsequent to the law's effective date.
The court found one issue for which the Act was intended to have a retroactive effect: "Congress intended to make only one narrow exception to the prospective effect of the Cable Act's franchise-fee provisions."62 That "exception" provides that a franchise provision requiring a five percent franchise fee is valid without FCC approval,63 even though prior to the Cable Act FCC permission was necessary before a fee greater than three percent could be assessed. 64 To prove the retroactive nature of this provision, the court quoted from the Conference Report:
Any franchise in effect on the effect [sic] date of [the Cable Act] that provides for a franchise fee in an amount up to or in excess of the five percent limitation in section 622(b)(with or without the need for action by any Federal agency) shall be deemed to have lawfully required such fee, up to but not in excess of five percent, as of such effective date, except that where a franchise explicity [sic] establishes a later date or any condition for the imposition of such fee, such later date or condition shall apply.65
The court incorrectly concluded that the language in the Conference Report, "makes it clear that any payments of franchise fees already [i.e., prior to the Act] made by a cable system up to five percent would be lawful without FCC permission if the franchise agree- Thus, the court was in error when it treated the Conference Report as implying a retroactive effect to the provision eliminating the need for FCC approval of five percent franchise fees. Congress did not retroactively make valid a franchise provision that was invalid prior to the Act. Instead, Congress grandfathered the provision so that it would be valid after the effective date of the Act. 67
There are several other provisions of the Cable Act that grandfather preexisting requirements. The broadest provision preserves in effect, "[t]he provisions of ... any franchise in effect on the effective date of this subchapter ... subject to the express provisions of th O b h t "68 IS SU C ap er ....
Other provisions permit regulation provided in pre-Act franchises that would not be allowed for newer franchises. For example, although the Act prevents a franchising authority from enforcing post-Act requirements that a cable operator provide "particular video or other information services"69 and any service, facility, or equipment not related to the operation of a cable system,70 a franchising authority may enforce any franchise requirement for services, facilities, and equipment which was in effect prior to the Act. 71
[d. (emphasis added)
. 67 The Conference Report contains language that may run counter to this conclusion:
Nothing in section 622 shall authorize any payment toward any such fee ... [i.e., a franchise fee in an amount up to or in excess of the 5 percent limitation in section 622(b)] for any period prior to the effective date of this title, unless such payment has been made prior to such date to a franchising authority. 130 CONGo REC. SI4,285 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1984) (emphasis added). The italicized language seems to imply that if a fee payment had been made prior to the Act's effective date, then Cable Act § 622, 47 U.S.C. § 542 (Supp. III 1985) would authorize such payment. There are two problems with this interpretation. First, it seems to contradict the earlier quoted language beginning the validating effect of section 622 "as of" the Act's effective date. See supra text accompanying note 66. Second, there is no language in the statute itself stating that it is to have retroactive effect.
68 Cable Act § 637(a), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a) (Supp. III 1985) . 69 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 68 (discussing Cable Act § 624(b), 47 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. III 1985) ). 70 Cable Act § 624(a), 47 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. III 1985) . 71 !d. at § 624(c), 47 U.S.C. § 544(c) (Supp. III 1985) . Similarly, all payments by a cable operator for support of public, educational and governmental access, required in a pre-Act franchise, are exempt from the five percent franchise fee ceiling.
The court in Housatonic Cable Vision held that these sections protect obligations imposed, not only in the original franchise as drafted, but as amended by modification, ordinance, or regulation prior to the Act: "The breadth of the Cable Act's definition of franchise, coupled with the legislative history, permits the interpretation that the relationship of the parties as it stood at the time the Act became iJfective represents the franchise for purposes of the grandfather provisons."72
There is one aspect of this court's discussion which may cause some unnecessary confusion. The court did not discuss section 637(a)(2),73 which grandfathers, for the duration of franchises that were in effect before the Act, provisions of "any law of any State ... in effect on October 30, 1984, or any regulation promulgated pursuant to such law, which relates to such designation, use or support of such [public educational or governmental access} channel capacity."74 Section 637(a)(lf5 differs from section 637(a)(2) in important respects. The former subsection applies to franchise provisions, while the latter applies to laws and regulations. The former applies to all areas of cable policy; the latter, only applies to access.
A key distinction between the two sections concerns the ability of government to impose new requirements on an existing franchise. Section 637(a)(l) bars the imposition of new franchise· terms, after the Act, to currently running franchises. Though section 637 (a)(2) also bars the application of new statutes to existing franchises, it permits the imposition of new regulations on existing franchises, if the regulation is promulgated under a law that predates the Cable Act. 76
The controlling statutory language states that "any law ... in (g)(2)(B), 47 U.S.C. § 542(g)(2)(B) (Supp.III 1985) . For post-Act franchises, only "capital costs" for access facilities are exempted. Id. at § 622(g)(2)(C), 47 U.S.C. § 542(g)(2)(c) (Supp. III 1985) . 72 Housatonic Cable Vision, 622 F. Supp. at 810 (emphasis added). 73 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985) . 74 Cable Act § 637(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). This subsection states that the word "State" is to be interpreted "as defined in section 153(v) of this title." Id. The Cable Act contains no section so demarked. Rather, section 602(15), 47 U.S.C. § 552(15) (Supp. III 1985) defines "State" to mean "any State, or political subdivision, or agency thereof." Presumably, that definition is meant to apply to section 637(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985) . 75 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985) . 7() Another interesting difference is that section 637(a)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(l) (Supp. III 1985) preserves franchises in effect prior to the effective date of the Cable Act (Dec. 29, 1984), while section 637(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985) preserves laws in effect on the date of enactment (OCl. 29, 1984) . Apparently, Congress was more afraid that onerous laws would be passed by state legislatures during the 60-day period between enactment and the effective date than that onerous terms would be placed in the negotiated franchise. effect on October 30, 1984, or any regulation promulgated pursuant to such law,"77 shall apply for the term of existing franchises. The limiting language "in effect on the date of the enactment" only applies to the word "law." There is no limitation on the word "regulation" except that the regulation be promulgated pursuant to a law in effect when the Act was enacted. 78 Such limitation could have been easily created if Congress had instead used the language "any law or regulation in effect on the date of enactment of this section."
The legislative history makes clear that this interpretation reflects true congressional intent, and not a mere syntactical error on the part of the drafters of the Cable Act. The Committee Report explains that the words "on the date of enactment" were added to section 637(a)(2) for "clarifying that only an existing state law, and any regulation promulgated under such a law, related to public, educational or governmental access, are ... grandfather [ed] ."79 Again, the time limitation only applies to the law, not the regulation promulgated pursuant to the timely law. Congress surely would have utilized the simpler phrase, "an existing state law or regulation," had it intended to limit the grandfathering to only access-related regulations in effect when the Act became effective.
Thus, the Housatonic Cable Vision court's conclusion that grandfathering only applies to the relationship between parties "as it stood at the time the Act became effective"80 is not completely accurate. The conclusion does not apply to the narrow category of regulations, relating to public, educational, or governmental access, which have been promulgated pursuant to laws in effect when the Act became effective. 8l Such regulations may apply to existing franchises. 1985) . The lower court relied on three different grounds for striking down the law: (1) preemption by the Cable Act, 611 F. Supp. at 1105 (see infra text accompanying notes 115-123); (2) unconstitutional vagueness, id. at 1117 (stating that defining indecent programming by its "time, place, manner, and context" failed to describe with "narrow specificity" which programs were prohibited); (3) overbreadth, id. at 1106-15 (stating that the only cable programming that could be regulated was that which was obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973); see also infra note 115). Although a summary affirmance constitutes the Court's holding as to the merits of a case, Hicks v. grounds 91 and the franchising case was remanded so that factual questions could be resolved prior to the Court's resolution of the constitutional issue. 92
In evaluating the constitutionality of cable regulation, courts should recognize that Congress has spoken on many of these issues and should pay particular heed to Congress' reasoning. 93 In 1973, the Court, when faced with a constitutional challenge to an FCC policy permitting broadcasters to refuse to accept paid advertisements,94 noted that Congress had left the question to the FCC. The FCC had concluded that "on balance the undesirable effects ... would outweigh the asserted benefits."95 Since the balancing of competing rights to free expression in the electronic media was so difficult, the Court stressed that considerable weight should be given to the congressionally created statutory framework:
Balancing the various First Amendment interests involved in the broadcast media and determining what best serves the public's right to be informed is a task of a great delicacy and difficulty .... 
96
Certainly not all congressional regulation of the electronic media is per se constitutiona1. 97 The point is that courts must acknowlMiranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) , the Court has stressed that a summary affirmance does not affirm the rationale behind a judgment, only the judgment itself. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) . Thus, especially when there is more than one rationale for a holding, it is impossible to tell the reasoning endorsed by the Court. See Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176 (stating that a summary affirmance "should not be understood as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts involved"). See also id. at 180 (Brennan, j., concurring) (stating that judges mllst determine whether a summary disposition "not even arguably [rests] upon some alternative nonconstitutional ground"). Accordingly, the Court's affirmance cannot necessarily be relied upon as a ground breaking precedent holding all regulation of cable indecency unconstitutional. This deference is especially appropriate for the issues covered by the Cable Act. The legislative history indicates an extraordinary congressional concern with protecting and enhancing the first amendment rights of the cable operatorY8 Additionally, the cable industry was intimately involved. in the drafting of the regulatory provisions of the Cable Act and supported the Act's passage. 99 Accordingly, courts should recognize that in enacting the Cable Act, Congress, far from ignoring the first amendment rights of cable operators, exhibited great sensitivity to their interest in free expreSSIOn.
Despite Thus, the court, though striking down an exclusive franchise, did not address the significance of the provision indicating the contrary congressional view. Section 541 (a)( 1) authorizes such franchise arrangements: "A franchising authority may award, in accordance with the provisions of this title, 1 or more franchises within its juris- 98 See e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26 (Congress "does not believe it is appropriate for government officials to dictate the specific programming to be provided over a cable system, and [the Cable Act] reflects this determination."); id. at 34-35 (an access requirement "does not chill the cable operators' speech"); id. at 69 (The Act "protects the cable operator from being forced to provide specific programming.").
!J!) The Chair of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, which hadjurisdiction over the Cable Act, described the industry's involvement with the legislation:
I requested the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors to sit at the negotiating diction." \03 This language explicitly gives local governments the power to decide on a single franchise: Moreover, Congress explained that the obvious interpretation was also the correct one: "This provision grants to the franchising authority the discretion to determine the number of cable operators to be authorized to provide service in a particular geographic area."I04 In another case involving exclusive franchises, the Ninth Circuit appeared to disregard both the plain meaning of the Cable Act and its legislative history in finding the Act consistent with a holding that such franchising was unconstitutional. \05 The court seemed to limit section 544(a)(1) \06 to merely an authorization for "the government to protect its interest in regulating disruption of public resources through a system oj permits or jranchises."I07 The court stated that it could not agree "with the suggestion in the legislative history" that cities had the discretion to select the number of operators that would be permitted to wire the community, stating that, "[a] construction of such breadth would be invalid." \08 A court certainly should strive to construe statutes so as to avoid finding them unconstitutional. \09 Nonetheless, it may not rewrite the statute in conflict with clear legislative language. I \0 More significantly, both these decisions on franchising, as well as several other opinions, III have overlooked the directive of the Supreme Court. I 12 Congress has painstakingly created a regulatory framework which covers regulatory issues including: the granting and renewal of franchises, mandatory third party access, and 103 Cable Act § 621(a)(I), 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (Supp. III 1985 franchise fees. 113 A court confronted with a constitutional challenge to such regulation must pay "careful attention" I 14 to the reasoning and determinations of Congress. Even if it ultimately disagrees with Congress, the court must explain why it felt constrained to rule the opposite way.
One district court did utilize the Cable Act in a case involving the constitutionality of state cable regulation, and concluded that the Cable Act preempted state regulation of "indecent" cable programming.
115 As the court noted, the Cable Act bars states and cities from imposing "requirements regarding the provision or content of cable services, except as expressly provided in this Article." 116 120 Cable Act § 612(h), 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. III 1985) (permitting local regulation of programming on commercial access channels ifthe programming is "obscene, or is in conflict with community standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent") (emphasis added); Cable Act § 624(d)(2)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985) (requiring signal blocking devices, so-called "lock boxes" to be provided "[i]n order to restrict the viewing of programming which is obscene or indecent") (emphasis added). The "lock box," which allows a viewer to "lock out" certain channels and keep them off the home television screen, was intended by Congress to provide "one means to effectively restrict the availability of [ [Vol. 6: 1 information sources and services to the public." 125
III. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC CABLE ACT SECTIONS
A. Rate Regulation
One of the major changes created by the Cable Act was the deregulation of subscriber rates for "basic cable service" in franchise areas where the cable system was "subject to effective competition."126 The FCC was given authority to define such "effective competition," and, after a two year transition period, 127 franchising authorities have only been permitted to regulate subscriber rates for basic cable service in those localities which meet the FCC's definition. In other communities, cable operators have been free to increase rates at their own discretion.
The FCC defined "effective competition" for a cable system as occurring when at least three local over-the-air broadcast television signals were available in a community.128 A signal was defined as being available if it placed a "predicted Grade B contour" over any part of that community or if the signal was "significantly viewed." 129 On appeal, the FCC's determination that three broadcast signals created "effective competition" for a cable system was upheld. 130 The court, however, concluded that the definition of "availability" as including a signal that theoretically might cover "any" part, no matter how slight, of a community created an "enormous margin of error" for determining actual availability of signals. 131 The court remanded this part of the rulemaking back to the FCC for further examination.
The court also rejected the FCC's determination that in those communities where rate regulation of "basic cable service" would be permitted, regulation would be permitted for only one 125 Cable Act § 601(4), 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (Supp. III 1985) . 121i Cable Act § 623(b), 47 U.S.C. § 543(b) (Supp. III 1985 tier of service that provided service to all subscribers. 132 In holding that the FCC was bound by the Act's broader definition of "basic cable service," 133 the court rejected a statement in the legislative history to the Act that the FCC was free to establish its own definition of "basic cable service." The legislative history stated that the Act's definition was only for the two year transition period and that the FCC had "flexibility" in determining its definition of "basic cable service." 134 The court rejected this use of the legislative history because on the matter of defining "basic cable service," the Act speaks "with crystalline darity."135 Since the Act itself did not contain any limitation on its definition, the FCC did not have the flexibility envisioned in the legislative history. While most of the legal battles over rate regulation involved the FCC's definition of "effective competition,"136 several courts have dealt with rate regulation issues outside of the FCC's jurisdiction. Although these cases involve issues that arose during the transition period, many of these issues will be relevant to those franchises that will continue to be rate-regulated due to a lack of "effective competition."
In Village of Schaumburg v. Cablenet, Inc., 137 a cable operator increased subscriber rates over one hundred percent. 138 The Village objected on two grounds: 1) the cable company had not given the 180-day notice of rate increase required by the Cable Act; 139 and 2) the operator had increased rates more than the five percent allowed by the Act. 140
Before reaching the substance of the Village's complaint, the court had to rule on the meaning of the word "franchise." Section 623(c) permitted rate regulation during the transition period, "to the extent provided in a franchise. before the court, however, did not contain the specific provisions governing local regulation of rates; those details were contained ina local ordinance which was referred to in the franchise. 142 The court ruled that the existence of rate regulation power in the ordinance was sufficient to meet the statutory definition. 143 This holding reflects both the purpose behind the statutory language, which merely required that the cable operator be subject to rate regulation prior to the enactment of the Cable Act, and the broad statutory definiton of "franchise." 144
Despite the holding that rate regulation was permitted, the court concluded that the rate increase was valid. 145 Even though the Cable Act provides for a ISO-day waiting period following a request for a rate increase so that a franchising authority can decide whether to veto such an increase,146 the court held that this period could be shortened by the franchise. 147 Since the franchise only required ninety days notice and the cable operator had met that limit, the court held that the time requirement had been fulfilled. 148 Similarly, the court held that the automatic five percent per year rise in subscriber rates permitted in the Act 149 could be increased by the franchise. Moreover, if the franchise did not itself 142 The franchise stated that the cable operator accepted all obligations imposed by the ordinance, "to the same degree and extent as if each and every such provision were repeated." Village of Schaumburg, at screen 3.
143 Id.
144 According to the Cable Act, "franchise" encompasses any authorization for the operation of a cable system, "whether such authorization is designated as a franchise, permit, license, resolution, contract, certificate, agreement, or otherwise." Cable Act § 602(8), 47 U.S.C. § 522 (8) 149 Cable Act § 623(e)(l), 47 U.S.C. § 543(e)(I) (Supp. III 1985) . One court has ruled that the statutory language permitting a five percent incre;!se "per year," permits the increase each calendar year, rather than after a twelve month period dating from an increase. Town of Barnstable v. TCI-Taft Cablevision Assoc., No. 86-0143, (D. Mass. May 13, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The automatic increase is available unless a franchise, in existence on the effective date of the Cable Act (Dec. 29, 1984), specifies "a fixed rate or rates for basic cable service for a specified period or periods which would be exceeded if such increase took effect." Cable Act § 623(e)(I), 47 U.S.C. § 543(e)(l) (Supp. III 1985) . A franchise that establishes a particular rate does not specify a "fixed" rate if it permits the rate to be increased with the approval of the franchis-limit the increase, the cable operator would be free to raise rates by more than five percent. 150 Although the ordinance in Schaumburg only gave the Village the power to reject a proposed increase by holding a hearing, no hearing was held. The court concluded that since nothing in the franchise prevented the doubling of subscriber rates, the increase was permissible under the Cable Act. 151 The court's logic in Schaumburg was the same for both of these provisions; the Cable Act rate regulation provisions were not intended to add any burdens to the cable operator. According to the court, "Congress did not intend to place restrictions where none existed . . .. There is no basis to believe that in a case such as this, limitations were intended to be imposed which were not otherwise established by ordinance or contract."152
It is not at all clear, however, that the same principle should apply to both the five percent increase and the lBO-day provisions. In providing for the automatic rate increase, Congress explicitly stated that the increase was "[i]n addition to any other rate increase which is subject to the approval of a franchising authority."153 Thus, Congress envisioned that a franchise might well permit additional rate increases. 154
In contrast, the Cable Act states that a franchising authority has IBO days to render a decision on a request for a rate increase, "unless the lBO-day period is extended by mutual agreement of the cable operator and the franchising authority."155 There is nothing in the statutory language that permits the time period to be reduced by mutual agreement. Congress apparently felt that since the cable operator was permitted to raise rates by five percent without notice or local approval, franchising authorities should be given sufficient time to act on additional increases. Congress also determined that IBO days was an appropriate time. (Supp. III 1985) . 154 The legislative history also indicates that the five percent increase could be expanded by the franchise; "This automatic increase is not meant to be a ceiling on rates .... [Congress] intends that the automatic increase ... shall be available in addition to any other increase procedure that may be established by a franchise." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 67-68. 155 Cable Act § 623(d), 47 U.S.C. § 543(d) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). 156 The legislative history also implies no power to shorten the 180-day limit. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 67 ("[S]ubsection 623(d) requires that a franchising [Vol. 6: 1 cordingly, the Schaumburg court may have incorrectly permitted a shorter time period than that required by the Cable Act.
An issue involving rate regulation that may have significant ramifications for the future is the meaning of the word "rates." Congress has preempted local regulation of "the rates for the provision of cable service," except for basic service of those cable operators not facing "effective competition."157 "Cable service" is defined as consisting of "video programming or other programming service together with subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection of such programming."158 Congress, however, did not define either what is meant by "the provision of cable service" or even the word "rates." One court which has addressed this question thus far has ruled that the scope of the federal limit on local regulation of "rates" can only be understood in the context of the other provisions of the Cable Act affecting local regulatory power. 159
In Housatonic Cable Vision,160 the court upheld a state prohibition on a cable company charging subscribers who reside in sparsely populated areas as "contribut[or]s in aid of construction."161 The court ruled that such contributions "are not rates for the provision of cable service within the meaning of the Act, and that the Cable Act does not preempt franchising authorities from making decisions concerning such contributions."162
What makes this decision significant beyond the question of line extension regulation is the reasoning of the court. The court based its determination on the fact that a separate section of the Act required franchising authorities to assure that access to cable service not be denied to any group of potential subscribers because of the income of those who reside in their neighborhood. 163 The court concluded that "[d]enying franchising authorities the power to prohibit contributions in aid" of conauthority act within 180 days ... unless the l80-day period is extended by mutual consent."). IliO ld. at 798. iii I ld. at 802. The court also upheld a requirement that a cable company should wire sparsely populated areas, (i.e., areas with fewer than 25 prospective subscribers), as within the local government's statutory power. struction would be in "direct conflict" with this requirement.
The conflict would apparently arise since such charges would single out one group to pay more for cable service, thereby contradicting the congressional "emphasis on encouraging equal access to cable television."165 The court concluded that it would not define the ambiguous phrase "rates for the provision of cable service" so as to conflict with unambiguous provisions of the same statute. Therefore, contributions in aid of construction may still be subject to local regulation. 166 Applying this reasoning, certain other charges by a cable operator may also be subject to local regulation. For example, the Cable Act requires every cable operator to sell or lease devices called "lock boxes" at their subscribers' requests. These devices. permit subscribers to block the reception of certain channels on their television sets l67 for the purpose of allowing subscribers to keep obscene and indecent programming out of their homes and away from their children. 168 Just as Congress stressed the importance of equal access to cable television, it also stressed the importance of making lock boxes available to all who wished to keep "objectionable" programming out of their homes. 169
Lock boxes are similar to line extension and do not fit into the definition of "cable service" as video programming. 170 As with the prohibition on contributions in aid of construction, if local governments wish to regulate the price of lock boxes so as to ensure their maximum availability, a ban on such regulation would "defeat express provisions of the same statute."171 Similarly, franchising authorities may be able to regulate the price subscribers must pay in order to receive access programming. Access programming is programming by third parties other than the cable operators and the programmers they select. The Cable Act "grants franchising authorities explicit authority to establish requirements for the designation and use of public, educational and governmental ("PEG") access channels."172 These channels were considered by Congress to "serve a most significant and compelling governmental interest-promotion of the basic underlying values of the First Amendment itself."173 Significantly, franchising authorities are empowered not only to require that channels be set aside for PEG access programming, but to "require rules and procedures for the use of the channel [s] ."174 Therefore, a rule promulgated under this section which governs the price consumers are charged to receive . PEG access channels would not be preempted by the Cable Act's limitation of rate regulation under the reasoning of Housatonic Cable Vision. Preemption, if permitted, would conflict with the explicit statutory goal of utilizing PEG access to create a "wide diversity of information sources for the public"175 and "contribute to an informed citizenry."176 Moreover, it may well be that fees charged by a cable operator for viewing PEG channels are not "rates for the provision of cable service"177 since the cable operator does not "provide" PEG access programming. Access programming is "provided" by the individual access programmer; cable operators merely act as "conduits" with no editorial discretion. 178 A perfectly consistent way to balance the competing purposes of the Cable Act would be to hold that rates for that programming controlled or selected by the cable operator are unregulated. The price charged for third party access programming is regulated to ensure, in the words of one legislator, "that local community needs for public, educational, and governmental programming are met." 179
B. Modification
Prior to the Cable Act, many companies sought to reduce the commitments they had made in their franchises with local governments:
[I]n many cities around the country, in the period before passage of the Act, cable companies sought to be excused from the performance of obligations under their franchise agreements, obligations which they found too onerous or too costly. In many of these communities, the franchising authority took the position that a cable operator ought to be held to its promises. 180
Congress, in recognition of these disputes,181 created a mechanism whereby a cable operator could force a franchising authority to modify franchise commitments. 182 In order to be relieved of a franchise requirement for provision of facilities and equipment, the operator must demonstrate that the requirement is "commercially impracticable."183 This phrase, taken from the Uniform Commercial Code,184 sets a difficult standard for modifying a promise made by the cable operator since: there must have been a change in circumstances; the change must have been unforeseen and unforeseeable by the cable operator and beyond the operator's control; and this change must alter a basic assumption on which the franchise was originally based, beyond simply lowering revenue or raising expenses. 185
While the precise circumstances necessary to establish "com- 181 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 ("The result of the renegotiation process has been to create very contentious relationships between franchising authorities and cable operators and artificially inflate expectations among consumers.").
182 Cable Act § 625,47 U.S.C. § 545 (Supp. III 1985) . The franchising authority and the cable operator remain free to modify the franchise on their own, outside of the procedures of the Cable Act. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 71.
183 Cable Act § 625(a)(I)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 545(a)(I)(A) (Supp. III 1985) .
"'Commercial impracticability' is defined as it is in the Uniform Commercial
Code, § 2-615. It is intended that this standard will be applied to cable operators' proposals for modification in the same manner that the UCC applies-recognizing that courts may need to make distinctions given the difference between the context in which it is applied here and that regarding the sale of goods which is governed by the UCC." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 71. ity. Thus, the reference in the legislative history to requiring modifications if commerical impracticability is shown in "negotiations with the franchise authority," 193 implies an obligation to give the franchising authority the opportunity to decide if the statutory standard is met before the cable operator may ask a court to review that decision. This view is also consistent with the general principle of exhaustion of remedies, which requires that a local government be permitted to rule on an issue before appeal is taken to the federal courts. 194 Since Congress requested that a franchising authority make a "final decision" before an appeal can be taken,195 it seems likely that Congress intended that the franchising authority be able to make its "final decision" after considering the same factors on which a court would eventually rule.
In the other major case on contract modification, Tribune-United Cable of Montgomery County v. Montgomery County,196 the Fourth Circuit held that a request for a modification "automatically stays any action on the part of the franchising authority to enforce the penalty provisions of the franchise agreement until its decision has been finalized."197 The court stated that Congress had provided that an operator who proves "commercial impracticability" is "relieved entirely from the adverse aspects of those portions of the agreement."198 Accordingly, the court held that the request for modification bars the imposition of penalties, not only for violations of the franchise after the request, but for those that preceded it as well. This bar is only to be lifted after the franchising authority has made its decision on the modification request. 199
The problem with the court's analysis is that the Cable Act never states that the operator is to be "entirely" relieved of its contractual obligations. The court's analysis ignores the fundamental distinction in contract law between "existing impracticability," when the cause of the difficulty exists at the time the contract was signed, and "supervening impracticability," when the event occurs after the contract is signed. relief available to the party unable to fulfill the contractual obligation. "The effect of supervening impracticability or frustration on the excused party is usually to discharge his remaining duties of performance. The effect of existing impracticability or frustration on the excused party is usually to prevent any duty of performance on his part from arising."20I Thus, the fact that an event has made performance of the contract as originally drafted impracticable does not protect the promisor from being in breach for contract violations that existed before the event occurred. The language of the modification provision of the Cable Act does not directly or implicitly reverse this black letter principle. At a minimum therefore, a franchising authority should retain the right to penalize the cable operator for any violation occuring before the alleged impracticability arose.
Moreover, if the operator is to be protected, at least temporarily, from penalty for its breaches of the franchise agreement, there must be a concomitant responsibility on the part of the cable operator to make the request for modification as soon as the impracticability becomes apparent. Otherwise, an operator could delay invoking the procedure right up to the time the franchising authority is ready to impose a penalty for the violation. For example, in Tribune-United Cable, the operator violated franchise provisions relating to wiring deadlines and to the construction of an Institutional Network ("I-Net") in addition to the subscriber cable. 202 Subsequently, the franchising authority issued two formal notices of default.203 The second threatened "to invoke the penalty provisions of the franchise agreement. "204 On November 8, 1985, seven days after the second notice and two and one-half years after the franchise was signed, the cable operator "formally requested modification ... pursuant to section 545 of the [Cable Act]. "205 .
The operator apparently made a deliberate decision not to comply with its franchise obligations. The court stated that the operator had, "decided not to construct the I-Net system ... [ 
20(i !d.
Prior to the request for modification, the operator did question "the economic feasibility of a number of franchise requirements" and "informally [requested) a review of the franchise agreement." Id. It is apparent however, that no notice was given of the final decision by the operator to breach its promises until the requirements had been violated and the penalty imminent.
should have required that notice be given to the franchising authority before the breach began. Such notice would give the county the opportunity to make alternate arrangements and possibly change the franchise to an intermediate requirement.
The Fourth Circuit stated that the imposition of the penalty should be stayed since, "[s]everely penalizing an embryonic cable operation which may be stymied by commercial impracticabilities before it has had an opportunity to take advantage of the federally mandated right to modification does not strike us as promoting the objectives of the Act."207 This reasoning will not help a cable operator who delays significantly in requesting modification after problems have arisen. As soon as the difficulty becomes known, however, the operator has this opportunity "to take advantage of the ... right to modification."208 A penalty imposed after a substantial delay in requesting a modification (and after a continuing violation of the franchise), therefore, would be imposed only after the operator had the opportunity to request the modification and thus would not interfere with the objectives of the Act.
Finally, it must be noted that the request for modification in this case occured before the penalty was imposed. Entirely different considerations would arise if the operator sought to be relieved of a penalty by requesting a modification after the penalty had been imposed. The court was concerned with cities placing a "burden" on the right to modify by imposing penalties. 209 Obviously there is no such burden if a penalty for a franchise violation is imposed absent the request for modification. A subsequent request for modification should not affect the validity of a previously imposed and previously valid penalty. .
C. Tenants' Access to Cable Television
The Cable Act supplements the cable operators' rights under a franchise by giving them the right to construct their cable systems "over public rights-of-way, and through easements ... which have been dedicated for compatible uses."2)O Since this language specifically encompasses all easements granted to utilities, by private as well as by governmental entities,2)) cable operators have sought to use this section to require landlords to permit the franchised cable operator to offer service to tenants.
In the two cases on this issue, Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enterprises,212 and Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enterprises, Inc. ,213 the courts found that the Cable Act does grant cable operators the right to enter private multiple dwellings through easements. The difference in the two cases is that in Greater Worcester, the court found that the cable operator would be unable to offer service to tenants "using only existing utility easements and public rights-of-way."214 Accordingly, the court ruled that the Cable Act did not give the operator the right to use the landlord's property to offer service. 215
By contrast, the Rollins court decided that cable operators would be permitted to wire the apartment buildings, since the apartments were "served by electric, telephone and, most probably, water and sewer easements."216 While neither court describes in adequate detail the factual basis for its conclusions, the latter approach seems to be more consistent with the legislative goal to "insure that the public receives the widest possible diversity of information services and sources."217 Therefore, the question should not be whether a "complete" cable system can be constructed through easements, but whether the easements will lead into individual apartments. 218 If they do, the operator should be permitted to provide service to any tenant who wishes to pay for it. The resulting wiring would run from the public rights-of-way in the street, through the easement, and into the apartment of the tenant who desires cable service. No legitimate interest of the landlord would be implicated, and the cable wiring in the apartment could be removed if the next tenant in the apartment did not want the service. 218 The landlord in Greater Worcester contended, "as a factual matter, that the utility easements [did) not extend into each apartment; at some point in order to wire [the apartment complex, the cable operator's) equipment will leave the easements and pass onto [the landlord's) property." Greater Worcester, slip op. at screen 40. While the court gives no further details about the property, and ultimately concludes that the landlord was correct, it is unclear how each tenant was provided with "telephone service, natural gas and electricity," id. at screen 38, without the various easements running directly into the individual apartments. Either the buildings in the case were of unusual design or the court misunderstood both the nature of the easements and the rights under the Cable Act.
Both courts seemed to agree that state laws granting similar or greater access for cable operators to apartment buildings were not preempted by section 621. The Rollins court, in fact, used the access laws of the State of Delaware to aid in interpreting the Cable Act's requirements. 219 The Greater Worcester court found the Massachusetts access statute unconstitutional, not because of preemption but because . it did not provide compensation for the "taking" of the landlord's property by the cable operator. 220 This interpretation of the state law is questionable, however, since the court also found that the federal access provisions did meet the standards of due process by requiring that property owners be fully compensated for whatever takings might occur from the installation of cable facilities. 221 The court did not explore whether the federal provisions would provide a landlord adequate compensation for damages "caused by the installation, construction, operation, or removal of ... [facilities necessary for a cable system] by the cable operator,"222 who obtains access under both the federal and state access provisions. If such compensation would be available and sufficient, the Cable Act would, in effect, provide the "just compensation" required by the fourteenth amendment,223 for the state statute's "taking."
D. Cable Piracy
The Cable Act contains two sections dealing with cable piracy: section 633, which prohibits unauthorized reception of "service offered over a cable system"224 and section 605, which prohibits unauthorized reception of radio signals. 225 Section 633 is intended to cover theft from the cable system itself, while section 605 covers reception of signals transmitted through the 219 Rollins Cablevue, 633 F. Supp. at 1321. "In resolving the question of the right of access, the law of the state in which the cable system is located may be significant." /d. The Cable Act, however, does not depend on local laws to govern the use of easements. While the Delaware statute led to substantially the same result as the Cable Act, the provisions of the Act will have the same meaning even in states lacking a similar law.
220 Greater Worcester Cablevision, at screens 13, 16, 18. 221 [d. at screen 41. 222 Cable Act § 621 (a)(2)(C), 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1985) . 225 Section 5 of the Cable Act amended the former section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (dealing with unauthorized reception of radio communications) and section 6 of the Cable Act redesignated it section 705. Nonetheless, the section was codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. III 1985) . Accordingly, it will be referred to in this article as section 605.
air.226 One major difference between the two sections is that piracy from a cable system for private home use is barred by section 633, but the Cable Act exempts from liability the reception of over-the-air signals, through home satellite dish antennae, for noncommercial private viewing. 227 The major issue that has been litigated in respect to both sections is the intent necessary to establish a violation. In Shenango Cable TV, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 228 a cable company sued the parent corporation of Radio Shack for selling a converter which enabled subscribers who received the least expensive tier of cable service to receive the programming of a more expensive tier without paying the cable company an additional fee. 229 The court ruled that Radio Shack had not violated section 633 because the converter was designed and advertised to perform two legitimate functions: 1) permitting the use of remote channel control; and 2) permitting recording of one cable channel on a video casette recorder during the viewing of a different channel. 230 According to the court, under section 633, a manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of equipment "is liable only if he intends that the equipment he produces and sells be used for the interception or pirating of cable signals and the equipment is designed solely and specifically for that purpose."231 Because it was "unquestionably clear" that Radio Shack's converter is "not a pirating device designed and/or manufactured to assist a user 226 The legislative history indicates a congressional intent:
To limit the applicability of (Cable Act § 633] to theft of a service from the point at which it is actually being distributed over a cable system. Thus, situations arising with respect to the reception of services which are transmitted over-the-air (or through another technology), but which are also distributed over a cable system, continue to be subject to resolution under section 605 to the extent reception or interception occurs prior to or not in connection with, distribution of the service over a cable system. HOUSE REPORT supra note 8, at 83. 227 Cable Act § 605(b), 47 U.S.C. § 605(b) (Supp. III 1985) . Unauthorized home reception is only prohibited if the programming is scrambled or otherwise encrypted, or if there is an established marketing system for a particular programming service. Id. at § 605(b)(I),(2), 47 U.S.C. § 605(b)(I),(2) (Supp. III 1985 231 Id. at 838 (emphasis in original). This is consistent with the legislative history that indicates that distributors, manufacturers and retailers should not be held liable for equipment, "which is used for legal purposes merely because the same device or equipment is capable of being used for unauthorized reception of cable service, if they do not provide the equipment with the intent or specific knowledge that it will be used for the unauthorized reception of cable service." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 84.
